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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 










AKOUAVI KPADE AFOLABI, 




Appellant.                          
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2:07-cr-00785) 
District Judge: Honorable Jose L. Linares 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 13, 2012 
 
Before:  McKEE, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge 
and JONES, II,
*
 District Judge. 
 
(Opinion Filed: January 4, 2013 ) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
                                              
 * 
The Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II, District Judge for the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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Jones, II, District Judge. 
Akouavi Kpade Afolabi (also known as “Gloria Lawson,” “Sister” or “Selina”) 
(“Afolabi”) was convicted in the district court on 22 counts relating to her participation in 
visa fraud and human trafficking.
1
  Afolabi contends that the district court erred in 
admitting certain evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and in denying her 
motion for a judgment of acquittal.  She requests that this Court vacate the judgment of 
conviction on the forced labor and trafficking counts and remand for re-sentencing on the 
remaining convictions; alternatively, Afolabi requests a remand for a new trial on all 
counts.
2
  For the reasons set forth below, we decline, and thus we affirm the judgment. 
I. Background 
As we write solely for the parties, we recite only those facts necessary to our 
decision.   
From October 2002 through September 2007, Afolabi (a citizen of the West 
African nation of Togo), her former husband and her son brought more than 20 West 
African girls, aged 10 to 19, from poor villages in Togo and Ghana into the United States 
on fraudulently obtained visas, under the pretense that the girls would go to school or 
                                              
1
 On October 14, 2009, a jury convicted Afolabi of one count of conspiracy to commit visa fraud, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 371; five counts of visa fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1546(a); four counts of smuggling illegal aliens, 
in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii); one count of conspiracy to commit forced labor, trafficking with respect 
to forced labor, and document servitude, in violation 18 U.S.C. § 371; five counts of forced labor, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1589; five counts of trafficking with respect to forced labor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1590; and one 
count of conspiracy to harbor aliens, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I).  On September 23, 2010, 
Afolabi was sentenced to 324 months‟ imprisonment and three years‟ supervised release. 
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  (Government‟s Supplemental Appendix (“SA”) 71, 202, 562, 621.)  
Instead, the girls worked in hair-braiding salons for up to 16 hours a day, six or seven 
days a week, and turned over all their earnings to the Defendants.  (SA78, 80-82, 232-39, 
248-56, 360, 372-77, 567, 635-41, 1243-48.) 
At Afolabi‟s trial, the Government introduced evidence that the girls were 
physically, psychologically and sexually abused in both Africa and the United States.  
Afolabi and her co-conspirators beat the girls, sometimes at length and with extreme 
violence, to ensure their compliance.  (Appellant‟s Appendix (“A”) 87-88, 153, 155-56; 
SA56, 88, 258, 284, 365, 372, 379, 570, 575-76, 600-01, 618, 621, 1248.)  Afolabi‟s 
former husband forced at least three of the girls to have sex with him and transported 
another girl, who was under the age of 18, from New Jersey to North Carolina in order to 
have sex with her.  (SA 382, 385-86, 668.)  When the girls tried to tell Afolabi about 
these sexual assaults, Afolabi either refused to listen to them or blamed them for the 
assaults.  (SA321, 577.) 
In order to demonstrate the involuntary nature of the girls‟ servitude in the United 
States, the Government also produced evidence that Afolabi and her co-conspirators 
                                              
3
 Afolabi‟s former husband, Lassissi Afolabi, pled guilty to two forced labor and conspiracy counts, as well as 
transportation of a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity.  United States v. Afolabi, Crim. No. 07-
785 (JLL) (D.N.J. Aug. 26, 2009) (Dkt. No. 120).  He was sentenced on July 22, 2010 to 292 months‟ 
imprisonment; his sentence was affirmed by this Circuit on December 16, 2011.  United States v. Afolabi, 455 F. 
App‟x 184, 187 (3d Cir. 2011).  Son Dereck Hounakey pled guilty to a forced labor conspiracy count and was 
sentenced to 55 months‟ imprisonment; another relative, Bernard Hounakey, pled guilty to two conspiracy and visa 
fraud counts and was sentenced to time served.  Neither Hounakey appealed.  See United States v. Hounakey, Crim. 
No. 08-529 (JLL) (D.N.J. Mar. 13, 2009) (Dkt. No. 21); United States v. Hounakey, Crim. No. 07-785 (JLL) (D.N.J. 
June 28, 2010) (Dkt. No. 195).  Co-defendant Geoffry Kouevi‟s case was severed, and he was convicted at trial of 
two conspiracy and visa fraud counts; he was sentenced to 26 months‟ imprisonment.  United States v. Kouevi, 
Crim. No. 07-785 (JLL) (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2010) (Dkt. No. 208).  His conviction and sentence were recently 
affirmed.   United States v. Kouevi, Civ. No. 10-3529, 2012 WL 5235260, at *11-12 (3d Cir. Oct. 24, 2012). 
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isolated the girls from their families, exploited their youth and lack of knowledge of 
English, and induced deep fear and shame at the prospect of being returned to Africa in 
disgrace.  (SA83-84, 87-88, 247, 256, 261, 278, 671-72.)  Afolabi and her co-conspirators 
confiscated the girls‟ passports and other identification to prevent their independent 
travel.  (A132, SA268, 371, 380-81.)  On the extremely rare occasions that the girls were 
permitted to speak to their families in Africa, they were pressed into lying about their 
whereabouts; one girl was forced to tell her parents she was succeeding in school (which 
she was in fact not allowed to attend), and another that she was living in Germany.  
(SA371, 569.)  The girls testified at trial that they were unable to leave Afolabi‟s control 
because they feared her, did not know anyone else, possessed no documentation, and 
believed Afolabi would “do something to harm” their families.  (SA278, 381, 674, 679.)  
Indeed, one girl testified that Afolabi‟s treatment prompted her to contemplate suicide.  
(SA286.) 
A. Admission of Contested Evidence 
The Government sought to introduce evidence that, while in Togo, Afolabi beat 
the girls and demonstrated voodoo practices in order to threaten and intimidate them. 
Although these acts had occurred prior to the indictment period, the Government 
contended that they continued to have a coercive effect on the girls even after they had 
arrived in the United States. Over Afolabi‟s objections, the district court admitted such 
evidence as both intrinsic to the forced labor and trafficking charges and pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).  The district court judge reasoned that under Rule 
5 
 
404(b), the Togo evidence was probative of a scheme or plan to lead the victims to 
believe that “serious harm would result to them if they attempted to disobey the 
defendant.”  (A2.)  He determined that the temporal discrepancy between the Togo acts 
and the United States acts—up to two years—was not enough to defeat the Togo acts‟ 
admissibility.  (A2.)  The judge noted that: 
even though the Government may have additional evidence of this conduct 
[the scheme or plan to intimidate the girls into labor] that they may 
introduce during the trial, it is not the type of situation where one would 
say, well, the evidence is so prejudicial, that in light of all of the other 
favorable evidence that the Government already has anyway, we should err 
on the side of not admitting the evidence.  
I think under the circumstances of this case, the evidence is 
admissible.  I think cases that have dealt with this issue and similar cases 
that have dealt with the issue of voodoo rituals, et cetera, like the other case 
we discussed earlier, have admitted the evidence. 
(A2-3.) 
 Accordingly, a victim named Vida testified that Afolabi beat her with a branch and 
a cane on three different instances in Togo, after Afolabi accused Vida of taking too long 
to bring a refrigerator repairman to Afolabi‟s house,  having inappropriate relations with 
a village man, and not preparing Afolabi‟s shower to the desired heat level.  (A87-88.)  
Vida also stated that she witnessed Afolabi beat another girl named Rose because Rose 
had taken Vida to visit a friend, against Afolabi‟s prohibition.  (A88.)   
Vida further testified about a “little room” in Afolabi‟s Togo house furnished with 
“handmade stuff” that Vida called “vedzu”—voodoo—which Vida understood to be “like 
a god” that could be used by its followers “to scare you…to make you crazy…to kill you 
6 
 
with it.”  (A98.)  Vida described a pot in the room used for sacrificing chickens.  (A98-
99.)  She also testified that Afolabi introduced her to a man named Pele, who tried to feed 
her “nut kola” and water.  Pele told Vida that the nut kola would bind her to Afolabi in 
the United States; if Vida did not want to stay with Afolabi and tried to leave, she was 
“going to go crazy.”  (A99.)   
However, when questioned on direct examination as to what she had believed 
would happen to her if she refused to work for Afolabi once she arrived in the United 
States, Vida responded only that she feared Afolabi would become angry and send her 
back to Togo.  (A103.)   Even when pressed, Vida did not testify as to any other fears of 
corporal or voodoo punishment.  (A132.) 
A second victim witness, Sroda, also testified to Afolabi‟s entering the “little 
room” in her Togo home and talking to herself, which Sroda understood to be part of 
Afolabi‟s voodoo practices: 
To me, voodoo is the worst thing, the worst thing to worship because 
it is just—I don‟t like it.  The thought of voodoo, it just breaks me down, 
and I don‟t know how someone would want to worship a voodoo instead of 
God, and I have seen lots of things happen through voodoo to other people, 
and it is not a good thing.  There are so many things that could happen with 
voodoo.  
 …[P]eople can use voodoo to make people physically or emotionally 
paralyzed.  Mostly they can make them blind and stop hearing and get 
talking problem [sic].  They can use voodoo to stop somebody from talking, 
and the common one is killing. 
…Because from what I know of voodoo, voodoo doesn‟t bring you 
any good thing or anything good from my point of view, so that is, it is 
better just to go with God.  That is how I perceive it. 
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(A130.)  Sroda went on to describe voodoo rituals she had seen that included animal 
sacrifices, and voodoo-induced blindness and paralysis she had heard about from family 
members, but testified that she did not witness any such sacrifices or other voodoo 
practices in Afolabi‟s house.  (A130, 134.)   
The third victim to testify, Ameyo, confirmed Afolabi‟s Togo beatings of Vida 
and another girl, Doveni.  (A142.)  Ameyo also discussed the existence of Afolabi‟s 
“room for voodoo” in Togo, with “little voodoo dolls,” but she did not witness any 
particular acts within the room.  (A142.)  Once in the United States, Ameyo did refuse to 
follow Afolabi‟s order to relocate from Afolabi‟s then-husband‟s house; when pressed at 
trial as to whether she was afraid of “voodoo magic” being practiced against her as 
punishment, Ameyo replied, “I don‟t know.”  (A146.) 
The fourth victim, Ahoefa, testified that she saw Afolabi hit Vida and another girl, 
Ajnele, and saw “something like a statute [sic] and like a stone” in Afolabi‟s “voodoo” 
room.  (A153.)  Ahoefa also testified that Afolabi took her to a voodoo priest, who killed 
a chicken and goat and spread the animals‟ blood “on the voodoos.”  (A154.)   
B. Limiting Instruction and Motion for Judgment of Acquittal 
Following Vida‟s testimony on direct examination, the district court judge issued a 
limiting instruction to the jury—an instruction that Afolabi agreed was proper:  
Remember at the beginning of the trial, I said to you that from time 
to time evidence would come in for a limited purpose, and I would explain 
it to you, and you could only consider that evidence for a limited purpose.  
Some of the testimony that you heard here today pertained to other 
acts or wrongs or crimes that were committed in Togo.  You remember 
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there was some evidence or testimony from the witness about some 
religious rituals that occurred there or some punishment that may have 
occurred there. 
Now, normally other wrongs or acts or evidence of other crimes are 
generally not admissible to prove the character of the defendant, or in order 
to show that the defendant had some propensity to commit a crime.  Just 
because she did something wrong in the past doesn‟t make you [sic] guilty 
of something today.  Except that other wrongs or acts evidence is 
admissible for your consideration with regard to some particular issues such 
as intent, a plan or a scheme, or knowledge or the absence of a mistake or 
accident in the commission of a crime. 
In this particular case, that evidence was introduced for those 
purposes, so you can consider what other acts or wrongs that may have 
happened in Togo with regard to making the decision as to whether the 
defendant was involved in some scheme or plan or intent and for the issues 
of the absence of mistake or accident with regard to the charges of forced 
labor.  
(A105; SA89 (Afolabi‟s agreement to instruction).)  
 Following the presentation of the Government‟s case, Afolabi moved for a 
judgment of acquittal, which was denied.  While not specifically mentioning the evidence 
of corporal punishment and of voodoo practices in Togo, the district court judge made the 
following statement with regard to the charges of forced labor and trafficking in forced 
labor: 
Looking at the totality of the evidence that came in in this case and 
the circumstances, although certainly one can argue that things were, as 
[Afolabi‟s counsel] claims they were, a reasonable jury could just as easily 
find that as part of the scheme, the girls saw punishment that was meted out 
to those who disregarded the rules, that they were present when rituals were 
done, wherein they were threatened with harm, if they didn‟t abide by the 




 On appeal, Afolabi now argues that the admission of the evidence relating to 
corporal punishment and voodoo rituals in Togo, even with the limiting instruction, 
represented an abuse of the district court‟s discretion. Afolabi maintains that none of the 
girls testified that she was intimidated in the United States by her experiences in Togo, 
and that the contested evidence substantially harmed Afolabi‟s defense.  In addition, 
Afolabi contends that without the Togo evidence, the Government failed to establish the 
girls‟ fear such as to satisfy the necessary element of the forced labor and trafficking 
charges.   
            II. Standards of Review 
We generally review a district court‟s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.  
United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 2010).  “An abuse of discretion occurs 
only where the district court‟s decision is „arbitrary, fanciful, or clearly unreasonable‟—
in short, where „no reasonable person would adopt the district court‟s view.‟”  Id. 
(quoting United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 214 (3d Cir. 2009)).  However, to the 
extent that the district court‟s rulings were “„based on a legal interpretation of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, we exercise plenary review.‟”  Id. (quoting Complaint of 
Consolidation Coal Co., 123 F.3d 126, 131 (3d Cir. 1997)).  “This includes plenary 
review „of whether evidence falls within the scope of Rule 404(b).‟”  Id. (quoting United 
States v. Cruz, 326 F.3d 392, 394 (3d Cir. 2003)).   
We exercise plenary review over a district court‟s determination that there was 
sufficient evidence to support the jury‟s verdict.   United States v. Bornman, 559 F.3d 
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150, 152 (3d Cir. 2009).  In considering whether there was sufficient evidence, we must 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, and “must affirm the 
conviction[] if a rational trier of fact could have found defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1243 (3d Cir. 1995).  We 
reverse only when there is “„no evidence, regardless of how it is weighted, from which 
the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.‟”  United States v. Mussare, 405 
F.3d 161, 166 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Anderson, 108 F.3d 478, 481 (3d 
Cir. 1997)). 
                III.  Admission of Evidence 
To prove that Afolabi committed, and conspired to commit, forced labor and/or 
trafficking with respect thereto, the Government had to establish, inter alia, that Afolabi 
knowingly joined the conspiracy to procure, and that she herself procured, the girls‟ labor 
by means of “force, threats of force, physical restraint or threats of physical restraint;” 
“serious harm or threats of serious harm;” or “any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to 
cause [the girls] to believe that, if [they] did not perform such labor or services, [they] 
would suffer serious harm or physical restraint.”  18 U.S.C. § 1589; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 
371, 1590.  “Serious harm,” in turn, “refers to a broad array of harms, including both 
physical and nonphysical.” H.R. CONF. REP. 106-939, at 101 (2000).  Section 1589 is 
“intended to be construed with respect to the individual circumstances of victims that are 
relevant in determining whether a particular type or certain degree of harm or coercion is 
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sufficient to maintain or obtain a victim‟s labor or services, including the age and 
background of the victims.”  Id. 
Accordingly, the Government sought to introduce evidence that Afolabi used 
voodoo to threaten and intimidate the girls as intrinsic to those charges.  Evidence is 
intrinsic in two circumstances: (1) if it “directly proves the charged offense;” or (2) if it is 
of an “uncharged act, performed contemporaneously with the charged crime” that 
“facilitate[s] the commission of the charged crime.”  United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 
233, 248-49 (3d Cir. 2010).   The evidence at issue here, however, does not seem to fall 
into either category. 
As to the first circumstance, the evidence does not “directly prove” the charged 
offense, as it is not evidence of “an act that is part of a charged offense.”  Id. at 248 
(quoting United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 929 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).  The Government 
sought to introduce testimony about conduct (corporal punishment and threats) that took 
place before Afolabi engaged in the criminal conduct alleged in the indictment, and so 
this testimony cannot be testimony about “an act that is part of a charged offense.”    Nor 
does the evidence satisfy the second circumstance.  Although the evidence may have 
facilitated the commission of the crime, it was not “performed contemporaneously with 
the charged crime.”   
If not intrinsic to a charge, evidence of other acts or crimes must be considered 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).  Green, 617 F.3d at 249.  Evidence of uncharged 
crimes or wrongs may be admitted under Rule 404(b) if it (1) has “a proper evidentiary 
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purpose;” (2) is “relevant;” (3) satisfies Rule 403;4 and (4) is “accompanied by a limiting 
instruction (where requested) about the purpose for which the jury may consider it.”  
Green, 617 F.3d at 249 (citing United States v. Butch, 256 F.3d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 2001)).   
Here, the district court judge issued a limiting instruction, which Afolabi agreed was 
proper, and the Togo evidence satisfied the other requirements as well. 
First, the Government introduced the contested evidence for several proper 
purposes, i.e., purposes “„probative of a material issue other than character.‟”  Green, 617 
F.3d at 250 (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 686 (1988)).  Despite 
Afolabi‟s contention that “[n]o girl arrived in this country with any fear of rape because 
of an observation in Togo or with a fear of a blindness due to voodoo retaliation,” (App. 
Br. at 46), the district court judge reasonably concluded that the Togo evidence served to 
illustrate Afolabi‟s plan, scheme, and/or absence of mistake in pressing the victims into 
her service.  The contested evidence included more than “testimony that voodoo was not 
uncommon in Togo” (App. Br. at 47); it suggested that Afolabi intended for her victims 
to believe they were “going to go crazy” if they attempted to leave Afolabi‟s control in 
the United States.   
Second, along similar lines, the Togo evidence was relevant to the forced labor 
charges and Afolabi‟s underlying intimidation of the victims.  Even where the victims did 
not testify to fear of voodoo as binding them to Afolabi in the United States, such 
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 Rule 403 permits the court to exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a 
danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, 
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” 
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evidence could be weighed by the jury as to whether the voodoo threats contributed to the 
girls‟ inability to leave. 
Third, the evidence satisfies Rule 403 because any potential prejudice resulting 
from the Togo evidence did not substantially outweigh its probative value.  See Fed. R. 
Evid. 403.  As noted above, the voodoo rituals that Afolabi engaged in had significant 
probative value.  Afolabi‟s conduct was suggestive of a general scheme or plan to 
frighten the girls into staying with her, and the jury could have reasonably concluded that 
Afolabi‟s threats made it more difficult for the girls to leave.  Although we recognize that 
the evidence of voodoo-related rituals could have had a prejudicial effect on the jury, the 
District Court carefully considered this issue, and its determination that any potential 
prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence was neither 
arbitrary nor irrational.  See United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 184 (3d Cir. 2010). 
Finally, the district court judge provided an appropriate limiting instruction, which 
Afolabi herself approved.
5
  We presume that the jury followed the trial judge‟s 
instruction.  United States v. Hakim, 344 F.3d 324, 326 (3d Cir. 2003).  While this Court 
recognizes the potential for prejudice under the circumstances, it notes that the district 
court recognized such potential as well, and weighed it carefully.  See United States v. 
Reme, 738 F.2d 1156, 1164-65 (11th Cir. 1984) (deferring to trial court‟s discretion to 
                                              
5
 Furthermore, with respect to the Togo acts and their effect on the victims, Afolabi‟s counsel did not request a 
hearing with witnesses under oath outside the jury‟s presence.  (Appellant‟s Brief (“App. Br.”) at 48.)  In fact, 
Afolabi‟s counsel acknowledges the “practical problems” raised by such a hearing, in light of the fact that some 
victims did not reside within the court‟s district at that time and that the trial took 19 days with a jury in the 
courtroom.  (Id.) 
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admit “highly probative” voodoo evidence to establish element of control in 
transportation of illegal aliens into United States and noting thorough limiting 
instruction). 
         IV. Sufficiency of Evidence 
In any event, even if the Togo evidence‟s probative value were substantially  
outweighed by its prejudicial effect and thus should have been excluded, its admission 
remained ultimately harmless.  The contested testimony was but one piece of the 
overwhelming evidence of Afolabi‟s coercion of her victims.  See United States v. Cross, 
308 F.3d 308, 326-27 (3d Cir. 2002) (prejudicial effect of cumulative “other acts” 
evidence did not unduly influence ultimate guilty verdict in face of other “overwhelming” 
evidence). 
Afolabi argues that without the Togo evidence, the Government failed to prove an 
element of its forced labor and trafficking counts. However, even if the district court 
judge had disallowed the testimony relating to Afolabi‟s corporal punishment and voodoo 
practices in Togo, or the jury had determined that the victims were not actually 
intimidated in the United States by Afolabi‟s alleged abuses in Togo, the Government 
presented sufficient other evidence of Afolabi‟s intimidation of the victims once they 
arrived in the United States to support the jury‟s guilty verdict.   
 Five victims testified at trial that despite promises of schooling upon arrival in the 
United States, they were forced to work 60 to 100 hours per week for several years and to 
hand over all earnings from the hair-braiding salons where they worked.   They testified 
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that they did so because Afolabi and her co-conspirators (1) separated them from their 
families, any school community, funds, or identifying documents; (2) threatened to 
deport them to Africa and to beat them violently; and (3) in fact did assault and beat 
them, with various implements.  This was enough for a jury to find that the Government 
had satisfied its burden, regardless of the Togo evidence.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Djoumessi, 538 F.3d 547, 552 (6th Cir. 2008) (defendant‟s threats to send victim back to 
Cameroon were coercive in light of victim‟s particularly vulnerable status as illegal 
alien).  Indeed, the district court judge here acknowledged as much in considering the 
admission of the Togo evidence, noting that said evidence was not unreasonably 
prejudicial upon consideration of the Government‟s other cumulative evidence.  
V. Conclusion 
 For these reasons, we affirm. 
